Envy and Loss Aversion in Tournaments

Gerald Eisenkopf and Sabrina Teyssier

No 52, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: In tournaments, the large variance in effort provision is incompatible with standard economic theory. In our experiment we test theoretical predictions about the role of envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Our results confirm that envy implies higher effort while loss aversion increases the variance of effort. Moreover, we show that standard theory provides a good explanation for competitive behavior when envy and loss aversion do not play a role in the decision making process.

Keywords: Tournament; Envy; Loss Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-neu and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0052

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