A fault confessed is half redressed - Confessions and Punishment

Verena Utikal ()

No 60, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: Confessions after failures are socially desirable. However, confessions also bear the risk of punishment. In a laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how the harmed party has learned about the outcome. The harmed party can learn about the outcome via random detection or self-report by the performer. I find that confessions are a powerful instrument: Punishment for confessed failures is less likely than for randomly detected failures.

Keywords: Cheap Talk; Confession; Experiment; Intentions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: A fault confessed is half redressed—Confessions and punishment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0060

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