On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

Andreas Nicklisch and Irenaeus Wolff

No 65, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish- ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de- gree of rst-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these subjects strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher xed costs of punishment lead to harsher responses. The fractions of purely self- ish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our ndings. The treatment e ect is unaccounted for. We discuss ways of incorporating our ndings into the existing models.

Keywords: Distributional fairness; experiments; intention-based fair- ness; reciprocity; ultimatum bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the nature of reciprocity: Evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure (2012)
Working Paper: On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure (2012)
Working Paper: On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0065

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