Path dependence in public-good games

Lisa Bruttel and Tim Friehe

No 67, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions in rounds 1-10 contributed more to the public good in rounds 11 and 12, even though they faced the same marginal return as the control group in these later rounds. In contrast, di erences in contributions were not significant when comparing subjects bearing the same current costs of punishment points, but having had different costs in the past.

Keywords: public-good game; team; punishment; path dependence; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0067

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