Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games: A Note

Timo Heinrich and Irenaeus Wolff

No 74, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this deviation can be explained by strategic level-k reasoning. Here we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, it is non-equilibrium beliefs that lead to the behavior observed in the earlier studies: when a player's opponent is forced to play the equilibrium strategy, the player's choices are uniformly spread over the action space. At the same time, we find robust evidence of an unexpected framing effect.

Keywords: Salience; level-k reasoning; cognitive hierarchy; hide-and-seek game; framing effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.twi-kreuzlingen.ch/wp-content/uploads/ ... ch-wolff-2012-03.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games: A Note (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0074

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Urs Fischbacher ().