EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

When best-replies are not in equilibrium: Understanding cooperative behaviour

Irenaeus Wolff

No 97, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: In many social situations, human behaviour differs from the Nash-equilibrium under selfish payoff-maximisation. Numerous social-preference models have been proposed, virtually all of them relying on the Nash-equilibrium concept. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result given experiment participants’ elicited preferences, and tests the various aspects of a ‘revealed-preference Nash-equilibrium’ by inducing common knowledge of preferences, using a publicgood situation as an example. The data show that in a three-player public-good situation, multiple equilibria should be expected relatively often (in a third of the cases). Second, most participants’ individual behaviour is in accordance with aspects of Nash equilibrium: most people best-respond to their beliefs, choose equilibrium actions, and consider beliefs that correspond to an equilibrium. However, many participants predict others’ behaviour poorly, which also entails that behaviour rarely is in equilibrium. This points to models like level-k as potential components for better social-preference theories. The experimental findings are obtained using experienced participants and robust to giving participants the option to look up the set of equilibria of their game, and to reducing the number of players to two.

Keywords: Public good; social dilemma; Nash-equilibrium; rational beliefs; conditional cooperation; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.twi-kreuzlingen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/twi-rps-097-wolff.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: When best-replies are not in Equilibrium: Understanding Cooperative Behaviour (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: When best-replies are not in equilibrium: understanding cooperative behaviour (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0097

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Urs Fischbacher ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-28
Handle: RePEc:twi:respas:0097