Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas

Bettina Rockenbach and Irenaeus Wolff

No 104, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with pre-specified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma “invent†and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.

Keywords: Public good; strategy method; experiment; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Journal Article: Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas (2016)
Journal Article: Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0104

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