What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

Irenaeus Wolff

No 105, TWI Research Paper Series from Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz

Abstract: Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to-omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

Keywords: Public good; social dilemma; Nash-equilibrium; conditional cooperation; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:twi:respas:0105

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