The impact of competitionfor the market regulatory designs on intercity bus prices

Javier Asensio Ruiz de Alda () and Anna Matas Prats ()
Additional contact information
Javier Asensio Ruiz de Alda: Department of Applied Economics, Univ. Autonoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain
Anna Matas Prats: EDepartment of Applied Economics, Univ. Autonoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain

Working Papers from Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona

Abstract: Spain regulates its intercity bus market by means of a ‘competition for the market’ mechanism, whose design has been modified several times in the last years. This implies that current services are operated under contracts whose conditions are heterogeneous. We take advantage of such fact to empirically measure the impact that regulatory designs may have on fares paid by the users. The results show very large differences between routes whose contracts were awarded under relatively open conditions compared to regionally regulated routes or very old contracts whose concessions were extended and have not been retendered.

Keywords: intercity buses; prices; tendering; competition for the market. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ecap.uab.cat/RePEc/doc/wpdea2201.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2201

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dept. Economia Aplicada ().