Emotions Enforce Fairness Norms (a Simple Model of Strong Reciprocity)

Raúl López-Pérez

No 2006/11, Working Papers in Economic Theory from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History)

Abstract: In experimental games, many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest and they do that in a reciprocal manner. In addition, many subjects punish those others who behave unkindly, and previous history usually influences subjects’ choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity.

Keywords: Emotions; Fairness; Path-Dependency; Strong Reciprocity; Social Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D63 D64 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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