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The Role of Social Ties in the Job Search of Recent Immigrants

Deepti Goel () and Kevin Lang

CLSSRN working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We show that among workers whose network is weaker than formal (nonnetwork) channels, those finding a job through the network should have higher wages than those finding a job through formal channels. Moreover, this wage differential is decreasing in network strength. We test these implications using a survey of recent immigrants into Canada. At least at the lower end of an individual’s wage distribution above his reservation wage, finding a network job is associated with higher wages for those with weak networks, and the interaction between network strength and finding a job through the network is negative as predicted.

Keywords: Immigrants; Job Search; Social Networks; Strong Ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J61 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2009-02-02, Revised 2009-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-mig and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Working Paper: Social Ties and the Job Search of Recent Immigrants (2009) Downloads
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