A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms

Michael Peters () and Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the competing mechanism game.

Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2010-05-13, Revised 2013-10-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Journal Article: A folk theorem for competing mechanisms (2013)
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