On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games

Michael Peters ()

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a set of mechanisms that we refer to as emph{reciprocal mechanisms. }These mechanisms have the property that every outcome that can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in a competing mechanism game can be supported as an equilibrium in reciprocal mechanisms. In this sense, reciprocal mechanisms play the same role as direct mechanisms do in single principal problems. The advantage of these mechanisms over alternatives like the universal set of mechanisms is that they are conceptually straightforward and no more difficult to deal with than the simple direct mechanisms used in single principal mechanism design.

Keywords: competing mechanisms; revelation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2010-05-13, Revised 2014-02-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-18

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