On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency

Seungjin Han

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: If the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.

Keywords: take it or leave it offers; menus; common agency; robust equilibrium allocations; mixed-strategy equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2011-05-26, Revised 2012-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Related works:
Journal Article: On take it or leave it offers in common agency (2012)
Working Paper: On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:seungjin_han-2011-11

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