On the Resolution of Conflicts Over Sacred Goods

Mukesh Eswaran

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze recent proposals from social scientists suggesting that when sacred values are involved in conflicts, progress towards negotiation can be made if the contending parties make symbolic gestures acknowledging the sacred values of their rivals. We incorporate this possibility in a model in which the allocation of a sacred good can be resolved either by direct conflict or by negotiations made possible through (costly) symbolic gestures. We identify conditions under which a negotiated outcome may obtain. Extreme asymmetries in military power and bargaining strength are shown to militate against the possibility of negotiation. Furthermore, for a negotiated solution to be feasible, perceptions regarding the preferences of the organization mediating the negotiations are very important. While isolating some of the root causes for the recalcitrance of conflicts over sacred goods, our model provides cautious optimism for the role of symbolic gestures.

Keywords: conflict; negotiatin; sacred goods; Nash bargaining; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2018-06-20, Revised 2018-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:tina_marandola-2018-6

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