Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol

Christian Almer and Ralph Winkler

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.

Keywords: Climate Change; Generalized Response Models; International Environmental Agreements; Kyoto Protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 F53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.vwiit.ch/dp/dp1014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Franz Koelliker ().