Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence

Marc Blatter, Winand Emons and Silvio Sticher

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the more so, the more firms report. Furthermore, the evidence is distributed asymmetrically among firms. Asymmetry of the evidence can increase the cost of deterrence if the high-evidence firm chooses to remain silent. Minimum-evidence standards may counteract this effect. Under a marker system only one firm reports; this may increase the cost of deterrence.

Keywords: antitrust; cartels; deterrence; leniency; evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 K42 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1405

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