Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities

Ralph Winkler

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents' participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.

Keywords: Downstream externalities; downstream incremental distribution; optimal emission abatement; river pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.vwiit.ch/dp/dp1508.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sharing a River with Downstream Externalities (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1508

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Franz Koelliker ().