Truth by Consensus: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

Gabriele Camera, Rod Garratt, Cyril Monnet

Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft

Abstract: Truthful reporting about the realization of a publicly observed event cannot be guaranteed by a consensus process. This fact, which we establish theoretically and verify empirically, holds true even if some individuals are compelled to tell the truth, regardless of economic incentives. We document results from an experiment where subjects routinely misreported a commonly known event when they could monetarily gain from it. Relying on majority consensus did not help uncover the truth, especially if complying with the majority granted small personal monetary gains. This highlights the difficulties in relying on shared consensus protocols to agree on specific events, and the importance of institutions with trusted, impartial observers

Keywords: DeFi; digital currency; dishonesty; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repec.vwiit.ch/dp/dp2404.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2404

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Diskussionsschriften from Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Franz Koelliker ().