Public, private and nonprofit regulation for environmental quality

Lucie Bottega () and Jenny De Freitas

No 33, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare implications of different institutions certifying environmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a for-proft private certifier (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certifier in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertisement reinforces the above result.

Keywords: Environmental quality; certification; green advertisement; NGO; self-regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 L15 L31 L51 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-reg and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dea.uib.es/download?filename=w33.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public, Private and Nonprofit Regulation for Environmental Quality (2009)
Working Paper: Public, Private and Non-Profit Regulation for Environmental Quality (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:33

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Xisco Oliver ().