Political support for the private system to finance political parties

Jenny De Freitas

No 35, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and redistribution level obtained from two systems to finance parties' political campaigns: the public and the private system. In the private system ideological voters make campaign contributions to increase the chances of winning of their preferred party. In the public system parties receive funds from the government. If voters are sufficiently ideological the private system induces high aggregate spending. Nevertheless, it may be supported by a majority of voters given the indirect effect contributions have on the equilibrium redistribution level and parties' probability of winning.

Keywords: Political economy; redistribution; campaign finance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:35

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