Imperfect Eco-labeling Signal in a Bertrand Duopoly

Lucie Bottega () and Jenny De Freitas

No 62, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: In a Bertrand duopoly model, we study firms’ eco-labeling behavior when certification process imperfectly signals environmental product quality to consumers. The test is noisy in the sense that brown products may be labeled while green products may not. We study how strategic interaction shapes firms’ incentives to get certified, equilibrium demand, prices and social welfare. We find that the eco-labeling policy is welfare enhancing for all parameter values. Nevertheless, the separating testing equilibrium may be too costly to sustain when the green firm probability to pass the test is small. Moreover, if the certification technology is soft, meaning that both brown and green units are awarded the label with high probability, it would be easier to sustain a separating equilibrium. This is a consequence of price strategic interaction between firms that gives firms incentives to coordinate on a separating equilibrium.

Keywords: Imperfect Certification; Eco-label; Duopoly; Welfare Analysis; Environmental Quality; Credence Attribute (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 D60 D82 L15 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-env, nep-ind and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubi:deawps:62

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