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Group-contests with endogenous claims

Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló (antoni.rubi@uib.eu)

No 70, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: Before group members individually decide their efforts in a contest to set a policy, groups are allowed to make some concessions to their opponent by choosing a less controversial policy to lobby for. When valuations over the set of policies follow a linear function, we show that concessions are never profitable when the success function is homogeneous of degree zero but they are when it is of difference form. Surprisingly, concessions might be detrimental for the members of the group that does not make them. Comparing this situation with another where efforts are decided collectively at a group level allows us to remark the effect of positive externalities of effort as the key cause of this damage.

Keywords: Group contests; endogenous claims; conflict; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Group-contests with endogenous claims (2016) Downloads
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