Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions

Walter Ferrarese () and Antoni Rubí-Barceló ()
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Walter Ferrarese: Universitat de les Illes Balears, Postal: Edifici Jovellanos, Crta Valldemossa, km 7,5 07122 Palma de Mallorca (Spain)
Antoni Rubí-Barceló: Universitat de les Illes Balears, Postal: Edifici Jovellanos, Crta Valldemossa, km 7,5 07122 Palma de Mallorca (Spain)

No 95, DEA Working Papers from Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada

Abstract: We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n-player games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. These fea- tures are met in a wide range of games, including contests, imperfect competition, or public good games. Our results aim to contribute an easy checklist for finding the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We apply these results to three examples.

Keywords: equilibrium characterization; homogeneous functions’ properties; non-homogeneous revenue function. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H23 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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