Dynamic Firm Regulation with Endogenous Profit-Sharing

Michele Moretto and Paola Valbonesi

Working Papers from University of Brescia, Department of Economics

Abstract: To avoid the extremely high profit levels found in recent experiences with price cap regulation, some regulators have applied a profit-sharing (PS) rule that revises prices to the benefit of consumers. This paper investigates the conditions under which a regulator can implement such a PS scheme, having contract closure as outside option if the firm's profits are excessive. We determine both the level of profits that triggers the PS and the consequent price adjustment endogenously. We then explore the PS dynamic efficiency in the repeated regulator-firm relationship.

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