Central Bank Reforms and Institutions

Oana Peia and Davide Romelli

Open Access publications from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: “Monetary policy independence remains of the highest importance, and it is important that we preserve monetary policy independence to help foster desirable macroeconomic outcomes and financial stability.” Stanley Fisher (November 2015) “The only problem our economy has is the Fed. They don’t have a feel for the market.” Donald Trump (December 2018) Prior to the global financial crisis, there had been much agreement about the optimal institutional design of monetary policy authorities. Economists and policy observers alike would have acknowledged that monetary policy is best left in the hands of independent central banks with a clear mandate of price stability. These inflation-targeting central banks were seen as the solution to the problem of high inflation and were credited with the period of great moderation that saw low levels of inflation and moderate output fluctuations (Alesina and Stella 2010).

Keywords: Monetary policy; Inflation; 2008 global financial crisis; Central Bank independence; Central Bank legislative reforms; Institutional design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/10911 Open Access version, 2019 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Central Bank Reforms and Institutions (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:oapubs:10197/10911

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