Banking Union and the ECB as Lender of Last Resort

Karl Whelan ()

No 201609, Working Papers from School of Economics, University College Dublin

Abstract: This paper focuses on how the lender of last resort function works in the euro area. It argues that the Eurosystem does not provide a clear and transparent lender of last resort facility and discusses how this has promoted financial instability and has critically undermined free movement of capital in the euro area. Until this weakness in the euro area’s policy infrastructure is fixed, it will be difficult to have a truly successful banking union.

Keywords: European Central Bank; Lender of last resort; Banking union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cfn, nep-eec, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://hdl.handle.net/10197/7860 First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201609

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