Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms

Michael Luca

Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2017, vol. 17, issue 1, 77 - 93

Abstract: Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central challenge faced by designers of online marketplaces is how to build enough trust to facilitate transactions between strangers. This paper provides an economist’s tool kit for designing online marketplaces, focusing on trust and reputation mechanisms.

Date: 2017
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