Monitoring and Sanctioning Cheating at School: What Works? Evidence from a National Evaluation Program

Claudio Lucifora () and Marco Tonello

Journal of Human Capital, 2020, vol. 14, issue 4, 584 - 616

Abstract: We exploit a randomized experiment in Italian schools to assess the causal effect of both an external monitoring program and a sanctions program on cheating behavior and absence rates. We find, in line with previous studies, that external monitoring is effective in deterring cheating occurring during and after the test. We show evidence of a strategic response to monitoring in terms of higher absence rates. Sanctions are not effective in reducing cheating, while they might have a discipline effect in decreasing absence rates. Both programs work better in institutional settings that make the potential loss of reputation costlier to the school.

Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Monitoring and sanctioning cheating at school: What works? Evidence from a national evaluation program (2016)
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