A Model of Rights

Nicholas Shunda
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Nicholas Shunda: University of Connecticut

No 2005-53, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

Keywords: contributions; political economy; rights; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 H41 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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