An Economic Analysis of Drawing Lines in the Sea

Paul Hallwood

No 2007-21, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: It is shown that low dispute costs relative to expected resource rents from oceanic resources favor drawn out disputes over maritime boundaries; asymmetric dispute costs favor agreement on boundaries wanted by the low dispute cost state party; and high symmetric dispute costs favor formation of joint development zones. The fact that most maritime boundaries have not yet been drawn suggests that state parties think that resource rents that can be drawn from the oceans are high relative to dispute costs. Moreover, the recent mini-trend towards JDZs in East Asia suggests that state parties in the area have recently reassessed dispute costs as being higher than previously believed.

Keywords: Law of the Sea; joint development zones; maritime boundaries; marine boundaries; lines in the sea (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 Q22 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-reg and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-21

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