Learning and Profitability in a Theory of the Firm

Paul Hallwood

No 2009-21, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Teams combine tacit and separable knowledge so complicating the pricing of knowledge and mitigating against knowledge transfer between firms. The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that entities possessing insider information should be ablest at accurately pricing any given complementary set of knowledge. Thus, even though some knowledge in a given complementary set is separable from a team, the easily transferable pieces are still most likely to be used within the originating firm. The boundaries of a firm may therefore expand even when knowledge is not tacit and transaction costs in markets for ideas are otherwise low.

Keywords: asymmetric information; evolutionary theory of the firm; governance; holdup; insider information; path dependency; rent appropriation; tacit information; transaction costs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 F23 L80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-com, nep-knm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2009-21.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2009-21

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel (mark.mcconnel@uconn.edu).