Takings

Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson ()

No 2014-17, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This entry discusses the economics of eminent domain, which is the government’s power to take or regulate privately owned property for the common good. It discusses the origins of the power as well as its limits, particularly as embodied in the public use and just compensation requirements. It also reviews the economics literature on how eminent domain affects incentives for efficient land use.

Keywords: Eminent domain; takings; regulatory takings; just compensation; public use; land use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-reg
Note: Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, J. Backhaus, editor
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-17

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