Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location
Tim Friehe and
Thomas Miceli
No 2014-31, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper incorporates the reality that the bulk of law enforcement is decentralized while sanctions are chosen centrally, and explores the implications for the socially optimal sanction level. The presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive law enforcement incentives at the local level. We show that the adverse repercussions of uncoordinated enforcement decisions at the local level may be ameliorated by setting a nonmaximal sanction at the central level. In other words, we establish that the decentralization of law enforcement may effectively constrain socially optimal sanction levels.
Keywords: crime; deterrence; federalism; spillovers; optimal sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location (2015)
Working Paper: Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-31
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