Health Insurance Coverage and Marriage Behavior: Is There Evidence of Marriage Lock?

Tianxu Chen ()

No 2019-09, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Premiums and eligibility for health insurance may cause “marriage lock,” in which couples stay married for the sake of maintaining health insurance coverage. By using the Health and Retirement Study for adults aged 60–70, I examine whether employer-based spousal health insurance coverage discourages divorce. Diverse difference-in-difference models provide evidence of a 7 percentage points increase in the number of divorces upon achieving Medicare eligibility at age 65 for people with spousal insurance coverage relative to those without it. The estimates thus provide evidence that marriage lock exists.

Keywords: Marriage Lock; Medicare; Employer-sponsored Health Insurance; Marriage Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 I1 J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2019-09

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