How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Emma Manifold, Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. The influence of own-group pay-offs has been studied before, but the other mechanisms have not. These new mechanisms combine to make redistribution depend on a hitherto unrecognized factor: the political representation of the minority group.

Keywords: Identity; Inequality; Redistribution; Minority Representation; Representative Democracy; Voting Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D72 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2022-02-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-his and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:02-2022

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