Reciprocity in Peer Assessments

Lunzheng Li, Philippos Louis, Zacharias Maniadis and Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: Peer assessment’s reliability can be undermined when participants behave strategically. Using a formal model we show how reciprocity can lead to reviewers inflating their rating of each others’ work, which is exacerbated when review takes place sequentially. We conduct a pre-registered online experiment and we find that reviewers engaged in mutual-review relationships inflate their reports more, compared to when reviews are one-sided. For sequential reviews, a non-trivial fraction of first movers maximally over-report. In accordance to our theoretical model, we also find that second movers are responsive to the review they received, but only when reviews are mutual. This reveals the potential for a quid-pro-quo element in mutual reviews. Our results highlight the importance of appropriately structuring peer assessment to take strategic reciprocity motives into account and ensure the system’s reliability.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Lying; Peer Assessment; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2024-12-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lma
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:06-2024

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