Resisting Persuasion

Elias Tsakas, Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: Agents that are subject to persuasion attempts often employ strategies that allow them to effectively resist. In the context of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011), we argue that if appropriate action-contingent payoff adjustments are available to the subject of persuasion, then payoff improvements are achieved. Remarkably, payoff-improving resistance strategies need not involve adding benefits to any action. We characterize the optimal resistance strategy when only costly payoff adjustments are allowed and we show that it induces a perfectly informative signal and a substantial increase in the agent’s welfare.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Resistance; Uncertainty; Public commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 K40 M38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/07-17.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Resisting persuasion (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:07-2017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().