Strategic Voting when Participation is Costly

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a general multiparty model of plurality rule elections with costly participation, and prove that strategic voting -that is, situations in which some voters abandon their most preferred alternative and vote strategically for the serious contender they like most- may emerge in equilibrium; just like when participation is costless/compulsory (Palfrey, 1988). This is contrary to recent claims that strategic voting cannot occur when participation is costly (e.g. Arzumanyan and Polborn, 2017) and establishes that the Duverger’s psychological effect is present in a much larger set of cases than currently believed.

Keywords: Multiparty elections; plurality rule; costly voting; Duverger’s law; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic voting when participation is costly (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:12-2018

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