Trimming Extreme Opinions in Preference Aggregation

Philippos Louis, Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: The use of trimmed mean mechanisms in collective decision-making is motivated by the perception that they constitute a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting under such mechanisms and –contrary to the above presumption– it demonstrates both formally and experimentally that: a) voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming and b) the outcome is more extreme and closer to the ideal policy of the median voter compared to when trimming does not take place. These so far uncharted properties of trimming provide novel insights –and call for caution– regarding its implementation.

Keywords: trimmed mean; equilibrium; experiment; collective decisions; facility location problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:12-2019

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