Selfish in payments, selfish in opportunities to obtain the payment

Giselli Castillo

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: Following the contemporary analysis on justice and preferences in distribution decisions, the present study analyzes the responses given by the participants in a laboratory experiment where they had to compete developing a real effort task and decide, in a distribution game, how the opportunities of winning and payments of both participants will be distributed. It is shown that preferences in distributions of opportunities of winning the game are extreme, that is, perfect equality or perfect inequality is preferred, while intermediate distributions are rare. Furthermore, those who prefer unequal opportunity distributions are also more likely to choose inequitable payments distributions.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp544

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