Corrupción, desigualdad y evasión de impuestos

Elvio Accinelli and Edgar Sánchez Carrera ()

No 514, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a society composed of citizens grouped in different economic strata based on income, who must pay taxes, but there are incentives to do so, and a set of public officials (auditors), whose function is to monitor compliance with the tax rules among citizens. We assume that corrupt auditors can accept bribes from evaders. We show that income inequality as a driver acts of corruption and tax evasion. Next we introduce an evolutionary model to analyze the progress or regression of evasion and corruption among public officials. We conclude with some observations on policies and incentives to combat these social ills.

Keywords: corrupt behavior; taxes; evolutionary game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 K42 O11 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-iue, nep-lam and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:0514

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