Flexible Exchange Rates as Shock Absorbers
Sebastian Edwards and
Eduardo Levy Yeyati
Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Abstract:
This paper studies how institutional factors and systemic risks (driven by macroeconomic conditions) prevalent in emerging economies may impact market discipline among banks (traditionally understood as market responses to bank fundamentals). First, we discuss how certain institutional features of emerging economies (underdeveloped capital markets, pervasive government ownership of banks, greater guarantees, inadequate disclosure and transparency) may affect market responses to bank risk. Second, using the recent Argentine crisis as an illustration, we argue that systemic risks may exert an overwhelming impact on market behavior, overshadowing the link between the latter and bank fundamentals. Thus, market discipline, while missing in the traditional sense, may be indeed quite robust once systemic risks are factored in. We conclude that in emerging economies the analysis of market discipline should take into account the importance of institutional and systemic factors.
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk, nep-ifn and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/empresarial/cif/pdfs-wp/wpcif-172003.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers (2005) 
Working Paper: Flexible Exchange Rates as Shock Absorbers (2003) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:exchangerates
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicolás Del Ponte ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).