NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints

Martin Besfamille and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

Department of Economics Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

Abstract: This paper analyses, in a simple two-region model, the undertaking of noxious facilities when the central government has limited prerogatives. The central government decides whether to construct a noxious facility in one of the regions, and how to …nance it. We study this problem under both full and asymmetric information on the damage caused by the noxious facility in the host region. We particularly emphasize the role of the central government prerogatives on the optimal allocations. We …nally discuss our results with respect to the previous literature on NIMBY and argue that taking into account these limited prerogatives is indeed important.

Keywords: Noxious Facilities; NIMBY; Asymmetric information; Mechanism Design; Constitutional constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2008-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpecon:2008-11

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