Brand bidding restraints revisited – What is the appropriate economic and legal framework for the antitrust analysis of vertical online search advertising restraints?

Elias Deutscher
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Elias Deutscher: Centre for Competition Policy and School of Law, University of East Anglia

No 2021-09, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper explores the law and economics of brand bidding restraints. By means of this novel type of restraints, brand owners restrict how their licensed retailers use their brand names and trademarks as keywords in paid search advertising. The paper tests and critically reflects on the restrictive approach European competition watchdogs have recently adopted towards brand bidding restraints. It contends that this harsh antitrust treatment of brand bidding restraints is not sufficiently grounded in the economic analysis of vertical restraints. In proposing a comprehensive framework for the legal and economic analysis of brand bidding restraints, the paper makes three principal contributions. First, it asserts that brand bidding restraints can have a number of procompetitive effects by internalising advertising-related externalities, addressing free-riding on display and traditional advertising and facilitating fixed cost recovery through price discrimination. Second, the paper considers different ways through which brand bidding restraints may harm competition and consumer welfare when they disproportionately affect infra-marginal consumers, prevent meaningful intra- and inter-brand comparisons or result in price discrimination on the basis of search costs rather than brand preferences. Moreover, brand bidding restraints are of particular concern when adopted in the context of dual distribution systems where vertically integrated brand owners have an incentive to raise their retailers’ costs to prevent them from cannibalising their own sales channel. Third, the paper explores various legal filters to disentangle and balance the anti- and procompetitive effects of brand bidding restraints. In this respect, the paper makes a number of policy recommendations for the future antitrust analysis of brand bidding restraints. These proposals could also inform the ongoing revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Vertical Guidelines in the EU and in the UK.

Keywords: Antitrust; online advertising; restraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ipr, nep-law, nep-pay and nep-reg
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