The all-pay auction with non-monotonic payoff

Subhashish Chowdhury
Additional contact information
Subhashish Chowdhury: University of East Anglia

No 09-09, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We analyze an endogenous prize all-pay auction under complete information where it is possible that none of the bidders wins and the winning payoff becomes non-monotonic in own bid. We derive the conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the unique mixed strategy equilibrium when pure strategy equilibria do not exist. The high-valuation bidder places two distinct mass points in his equilibrium mixed strategy and the equilibrium support of the low-valuation bidder is not continuous. Under common valuation, in the equilibrium mixed strategy both bidders place mass points at the same point of the support. Possible applications are discussed.

Keywords: contests; all-pay auction; no-win; non-monotonicity; pure strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D44 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/cbess/UEA-CBESS-09-09.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:wcbess:09-09

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cara Liggins ().