On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games

Francesco Ciardiello ()

Quaderni DSEMS from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia

Abstract: I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.

Keywords: Stable sets; Voting game; Convexity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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