The Bonacich Shapley centrality

Nizar Allouch, A. Meca and K. Polotskaya

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a consequence, the Shapley value belongs to the core, which enhances the attractive features of our new centrality measure. Then, we compute the Shapley value for various examples and illustrate some of its properties.

Keywords: Social networks; network games; peer effects; centrality measures; Bonacich centrality; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net, nep-ore and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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