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Endogenous Spillovers under Cournot Rivalry and Co-opetitive Behaviors

Isabelle Maret

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: We develop a model of Cournot oligopolists with endogenous R§D spillovers where a specific type of co-opetition is introduced. The two principle factors of R§D spillovers, namely the absorptive capacity and the information-sharing parameter, are assumed to depend positively on the percentage of knowledge the firm chooses to codify and reveal. It is shown that identical firms that are rivals on the final good market do not necessarily choose the lowest level for the spillover parameters. Furthermore, there is some justification for a subsidy to knowledge codification and information-sharing. However, the latter is obtained under conditions on firms' technologies and spillover functions which ensure the emergence of symmetric solutions.

Keywords: cost reduction; endogenous spillovers; information sharing; absorptive capacity; co-opetition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D62 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2003-10

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