The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements

Pierre Dehez () and Sophie Poukens

Working Papers of BETA from Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg

Abstract: We consider the problem of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements faced by standard-setting organizations. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents to be weak in the sense that they have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to weak patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements should look like.

Keywords: patent licensing; Shapley value; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2013/2013-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements (2014)
Working Paper: The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements (2014)
Working Paper: The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2013-03

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